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Abstract
Maintenance outsourcing is a strategic driver for asset intensive industries
pursuing to enhance supply chain performance. Spare parts management
plays a relevant role in this premise since its significant impact on equipment
availability, and hence on business success. Designing critical spares poli-
cies might therefore seriously affect maintenance contracts profitability, yet
service receivers and external providers traditionally attempt to benefit sep-
arately. To coordinate both chain parties, we investigated whether the spare
components pool should be managed in-house or contracted out. This pa-
per provides a decision-making framework to efficiently integrate contractual
conditions with critical spares stockholding. Using an imperfect maintenance
strategy over a finite horizon, such scheme maximizes chain returns while
evaluates the impact of an additional part to stock. As result, an original
joint value -preventive interval and stock level- sets the optimal agreement
to profitably allocate the components pool within the service contract. Sub-
sidization bonuses on preventive interventions and pooling costs are also es-
timated to induce the service provider to adjust its policy when needed. The
proposed contractual conditions motivate stakeholders to continuously im-
prove maintenance performance and supply practices, thus obtaining higher
joint benefits.
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1. Introduction
Maintenance outsourcing is a strategic means to improve business perfor-
mance. Outsourcing creates value through the use of external resources by
and for companies to acquire and sustain competitiveness [1]. The mainte-
nance function is a main driver of outsourcing since it has excellent potential
to achieve cost benefits and enhance performance among partners [2]. This
business purpose is meaningful for asset intensive industries -such as min-
ing, aeronautic, or defence- which face substantial investment in maintaining
complex equipment and high demand on system availability. For these firms,
main reasons to contract out maintenance tasks rather than perform them
in-house are focusing on core business, accessing highly specialized services at
competitive costs, and sharing risks [2, 3, 4, 5]. When dealing with outsourc-
ing, effective supply chain coordination allows achieving a rewarding situation
for all stakeholders [3]. Accordingly, a model capable of coordinately opti-
mizing performance can lead to successful maintenance contracting strategies
in capital intensive environments.
Spare parts management has a critical role toward operational efficiency
of asset intensive industries. Equipment criticality is defined by the most
relevant assets that efficiently and safely sustain production [6]. The opera-
tion of such equipment is consequently supported by critical spare parts [7].
Major spare components are related to considerable investment, high reliabil-
ity requirements, extended lead times, and plant shutdowns with important
effects on operational continuity [8]. A method to prevent production loss
events is having inventories at hand, especially when either target service lev-
els or backorder penalties are large [9]. This is the case of capital intensive
firms, wherein critical spares storage is directly linked to business success
due to the impact of stock-outs on assets utilization [7]. As an example, the
aviation supply chain holds remarkable US$ 50 billion in spares inventories to
provide availability service [10]. Efficient critical spares stockholding is there-
fore essential for companies in which success strongly depends on equipment
performance.
Maintenance contracts profitability might be significantly affected by crit-
ical spares policies. Particularly, the stock of critical repairable spares can
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be interpreted as a pool of components from where replacements are satis-
fied [7]. Consistently with the serious impact on operational and financial
performance, managing the pool of critical spare components becomes key
to improve profits within the service contract. However, as it depends on the
decision-maker’s position, both supply chain parties -service receiver (client)
and external provider (agent)- traditionally intend to maximize benefits sep-
arately. If the client controls the spare parts pool, there are scarce incentives
for the provider to avoid an indiscriminate use of components aside from reg-
ular restraints. Conversely, if the agent administers the pool, rational use of
components turns reasonable. Critical spares stockholding is a supply chain
lever to keep maintenance outsourcing viable for the parties involved.
In pursuit of coordinating the contracting parties, we investigated whether
or not the client should outsource the management of the pool of spare com-
ponents to the agent. This paper provides a decision-making framework to
profitably integrate the contractual maintenance strategy with critical spares
stockholding. Such scheme is based on a joint value -preventive interval and
stock level- that maximizes the supply chain returns while evaluates the im-
pact of an additional part to stock. Using an imperfect maintenance strategy
over a finite horizon, the model leads to an optimal decision to allocate the
critical spare components pool within the outsourcing contract. An inter-
esting link is thus created between maintenance performance indicators and
supply chain practices.
Having introduced the importance of allocating critical spare parts man-
agement within maintenance service contracts for asset intensive industries,
the rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the differences
between the enriched concept of the present paper and relevant existent re-
searches. Section 3 describes the model formulation to integrate maintenance
and spares supply indicators. Section 4 presents a case study in the mining
industry, which holds substantial spares inventories to ensure system per-
formance. Finally, Section 5 provides the main implications of applying the
joint model to coordinate the outsourcing strategy under an asset manage-
ment perspective.
2. Literature review
The following literature review is structured as the importance of the
management of the pool of critical spares within maintenance outsourcing
contracts.
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As an interesting strategy to achieve cost-benefits, consolidating inven-
tory locations by cooperative pooling has been addressed by [10, 11, 12, 13],
among others. In the context of repairable spares pooling, the cost alloca-
tion problem is analyzed using game theoretic models by [14]. As recent
implementations, virtual pooled inventory by managing information systems
is included in [15], and a calculation model of spare parts demand, storage
and purchase planning in the coal mining industry is reported by [16]. When
dealing with cooperation in contractual alliances, the study of [17] states
the relevance of interfirm trust to deter opportunistic behaviour in a shared
ownership structure. Such trust is an important issue related to pooling
strategies. A widely applied scheme for repairable items stockholding fo-
cused on system availability and spares investment is provided by [18]. Since
the accuracy to determine the optimal inventory levels for both single-site
and multi-echelon techniques, such model is used to adapt the concept of
spare service level in the present paper.
Maintenance outsourcing under supply chain coordination is discussed
by [3], study that deals with incentive contracts terms to coordinate agents
and clients by a maintenance policy seeking to optimize the total profit.
The work of [4] extends this approach by incorporating realistic conditions,
such as imperfect maintenance and finite time-span contract . That model
adapts the failure rate by using the system improvement model of [19]. Such
concepts of profitable coordination and imperfect maintenance are also used
in the present paper to improve the practical applicability for asset intensive
operations.
There are studies that specifically deal with allocation spare parts in ser-
vice contracts. A paper intending to incorporate repair contract selection and
spares provisioning under a multicriteria approach is presented in [20]. In
[21], a profit-centric model is presented for spares provisioning under a logis-
tics contract for multi-item and multi-echelon scenario. In [22], an inventory
model is developed for a repairable parts system by varying failure and re-
pair rates. A dynamic stocking policy to replenish the inventory to meet
the time-varying spare parts demand is proposed by [23]. A reliability-based
maintenance strategy required for the spares inventory is described in [24],
although the scope does not cover contract conditions. Since the relevant
effect of warranties as service contracting, a three-partite stochastic model
including manufacturer, agent, and customer is presented in [25]. However,
none of these works has faced the pool management problem by using the
realistic assumptions of imperfect maintenance, finite contract duration, or
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profitable channel coordination.
Regardless of the extensive literature, the present paper introduces new
contributions in terms of formulation and analytical properties. To the best of
our knowledge, a model capable of delivering profitable decisions to allocate
the pool of critical spare parts within maintenance outsourcing contracts -via
the inclusion of imperfect maintenance and the optimal conditions for supply
chain coordination- has not been addressed in the literature.
3. Model Formulation
Consider a system belongs to a fleet of equipment whose operation is
supported by a pool of repairable components. The proposed model op-
timizes the management decisions of critical spare components within the
outsourcing service contract. The formulation is presented in three sections
as follows: (i) preventive maintenance (PM) policy under the contractual
conditions scheme, (ii) service level associated with the stock of critical spare
parts, and (iii) decision-making model to integrate PM interval with optimal
spares inventory to maximize global profits. The terms ”client” and ”agent”
will henceforth be adopted to indicate service receiver and external provider,
respectively.
3.1. Contractual preventive maintenance policy
Let the maintenance of the fleet system be contracted out by the client
to the agent. For sake of self-containment, relevant maintenance contract
conditions -such as imperfect maintenance and finite contract horizon- de-
veloped in [3, 4, 19] are described in detail. The scheme is set by the following
conditions.
• The interval between preventive interventions (PM interval) is T .
• The agent is free to select the age T at which PM will be performed.
• Direct costs and length of PM are, respectively, Cp and Tp.
• Direct costs and length of corrective interventions are, respectively, Cr
and Tr.
• The basic service fee to the agent is p.
• The net revenue of the client after production costs is r.
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• The agent set a minimum expected profit pi to participate in the game.
• The finite horizon is as the contract lasts from the beginning of a system
life cycle to the end of the n-th overhaul.
The system has a Weibull distribution with shape parameter
β > 1. (1)
The inclusion of imperfect maintenance into the failure rate is based on
the system improvement model [19]. Each PM intervention restores the sys-
tem condition to almost as good as new according to
hk(t) = αhk−1(t− T ) + (1− α)hk−1(t) (2)
where t denotes lifetime, k corresponds to the index of the k-th preventive
action, and α ∈ [0, 1] is the maintenance improvement factor.
Before the first preventive intervention, the failure rate is:
h(t) = h0βt
β−1, t < T. (3)
The expected number of failures H after n overhauls is
H(nT ) =
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
αn−i(1− α)i−1H0(iT ) (4)
where H0 =
∫ nT
0
h(t)dt.
For β integer, the expected number of failures is
H(nT ) = κh0T
β (5)
where values of κ, some of them summarized in Table 1, depend on both α
and n for different integer values of β.
As the duration of the contract is n (T + Tp), the expected maintenance
direct cost is
CM(nT ) =
Cp +H(nT )Cr
n (T + Tp)
. (6)
In addition, the expected availability during the contract as a function of
maintenance interventions is
AM(nT ) =
nT −H(nT )Tr
n (T + Tp)
. (7)
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Table 1: Values of κ as inclusion of imperfect maintenance and finite horizon.
β κ
1 n
2 n2(1− α) + nα
3 n(n− 1)(n− 2)(1− α)2 + 3n(n− 1)(1− α) + n
From a perspective biased by single interests, it is clear that the client
focuses on maximizing availability, whereas the agent focuses on minimizing
maintenance costs. To achieve the cooperation of both parties, the next
sections describe an optimal PM interval (T ) aiming to the entire chain
benefit while adding the influence of the critical spares inventory.
3.2. Spare components service level
The concept of spare components service level allows incorporating the
preventive maintenance policy described in the above mentioned section. Es-
timation of system availability as a function of critical spare parts stock is
adapted from the inventory model for repairable items developed in [18]. For
sake of conciseness, an one component case is treated but the extension to
multi-components is straightforward. The approach is as follows.
• The system belonging to the fleet of equipment requires I types of
repairable spare components.
• The fleet size is N and the multiplicity of each type of spare components
in the equipment is zi.
• Stock level of critical spare parts is S.
• Turn-around time, as the workshop repair cycle from removal of a com-
ponent until readiness to use, is Tat.
We propose the following approach to incorporate the impact of PM in-
terval on the critical spare parts demand to workshop. The demand λ(T ) is
updated as a function of each interval T from the maintenance policy by
λ(T ) =
Nzi
MTBI(T ) + TpR(T ) + Tr (1−R(T )) (8)
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where R(T ) is the reliability function at T and MTBI(T ) =
∫ T
0
R(t)dt is the
mean time between interventions.
Expected backorders with spares stock level S, the unfilled number of
demands for not having sufficient inventory, is
EBO(s) =
∞∑
j=S+1
(j − S)(λ(T )Tat)
je−(λ(T )Tat)
j!
. (9)
Expected service level of equipment given by spares stock is then
AS(S) =
I∏
i=1
(
1− EBOi(Si)
Nzi
)zi
(10)
where the aim is to maximize equipment availability, or analogously to mini-
mize expected backorders, as a function of the optimal investment in critical
spare part inventories.
This service level usually corresponds to the fraction of time that equip-
ment can operate because of critical spare parts are at hand. Nevertheless, in
this indicator it has been included the maintenance policy from the critical
equipment system under contracting. In the next section, both maintenance
contracts conditions and spare components service level are linked as an in-
tegrated approach.
3.3. Optimal integrate maintenance policy with spares service level
The following model provides a decision-making framework to optimally
decide whether the spare components pool should be managed by the client
or the agent. Taking this premise into account, the system availability of
interest is that which integrates the maintenance preventive policy with the
spares service level, so that
A(nT, S) = 1−
∏
(1− AM(nT )) (1− AS(S)) (11)
where AM(nT ) is given by Eq. 7 and AS(S) by Eq. 10.
Expected global cost of spares inventory CG(S) during the contract is
CG(S) = Cv(S) + Ch(S) + Cd(S) (12)
where
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• Cv(S) = ncu
(
S0 +
∑
j Sj
)
CRF is the discounted acquisition cost of
investment in spare parts, where cu is the new spare acquisition cost,
i is the discount factor, and CRF =
(
i(1+i)n(T+Tp)
i(1+i)n(T+Tp)−1
)
is the capital
recovery factor across the contract horizon n(T + Tp).
• Ch(S) = cu
(
S0 +
∑
j Sj
)
ch0CRF is the holding cost for keeping in-
ventories at hand, where ch0 is the holding cost rate.
• Cd(S) = cd0(1 − A(nT, S))
∑
j Nj is the downtime cost given by the
production loss period, where cd0 is the downtime cost rate.
This model is capable of efficiently integrating critical spare parts stock-
holding with outsourcing contracts design. The main options to handle the
spare components pool within the maintenance service contract are presented
next.
3.3.1. Option 1: Client manages the pool of spare parts
Option 1 sets the contractual framework in which the client agrees to
manage the pool of spare components. In this scenario, although agreement
restraints, there are no major incentives for the agent to avoid an indiscrim-
inate use of components. Following the lead of [3] and [4], profits for the
supply chain can be adapted as follows.
Let Πc(nT, S) be the expected profit for the client. As the client man-
ages the pool, its profit is affected by the entire spares global cost; that is,
acquisition cost, holding cost, and downtime cost. Hence, this profit is
Πc(nT, S) = rA(nT, S)− p− CG(S). (13)
Moreover, let Πa(nT, S) be the expected profit for the agent. Under this
scenario, the profit for the agent is only affected by the service fee and the
preventive maintenance cost. That is
Πa(nT, S) = p− CM(nT ). (14)
3.3.2. Option 2: Agent manages the pool of spare parts
Option 2 sets the contractual framework in which the agent agrees to
handle the pool of spare components. If so, a policy based on rational use
of components turns suitable for the agent. Profits for the supply chain are
the following.
9
Although the client does not cover the entire spares global cost, its benefit
is still impacted by the related downtime cost. The expected profit for the
client is therefore
Πc(nT, S) = rA(nT, S)− p− Cd(S). (15)
As the agent manages the pool, its benefit is affected by both acquisition
cost and holding cost. The expected profit for the agent is hereby
Πa(nT, S) = p− CM(nT )− (Cv(S) + Ch(S)). (16)
Ultimately, the total expected profit for the service chain Π(nT, S) valid
for both Option 1 and Option 2 is
Π(nT, S) = rA(nT, S)− CM(nT )− CG(S). (17)
Using this framework, the chain coordination can be achieved by selecting
the optimal joint value [T, S] that maximizes Π(nT, S). This policy profitably
allocates the spare components pool, while both contracting parties obtaining
higher benefits than pursuing single objectives separately.
3.4. Coordination mechanisms for optimal joint values
Coordination mechanisms can be used to ensure a cooperative setting
under the above mentioned Option 1 and Option 2. Following the lead of [3]
and [4], subsidization bonuses on both PM intervals and spares acquisition
and holding costs can be adapted to set parties joint values [T, S] with the
one of the supply chain.
3.4.1. Cost subsidization under Option 1
When the PM interval of the agent is higher than optimal T of the sup-
ply chain, the client agrees to subsidize the direct cost of PM to create an
incentive for the agent. If let ∆Cp be the PM subsidization bonus, the new
preventive cost is
C ′p = Cp −∆Cp. (18)
The expected profit for the client adding the bonus effect is
Πc(nT, S) = rA(nT, S)− p− CG(S)− n∆Cp
n(T + Tp)
= rA(nT, S)− p− CG(S)− ∆Cp
T + Tp
. (19)
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The expected profit for the agent adding the bonus effect is
Πa(nT, S) = p− CM(nT ) + n∆Cp
n(T + Tp)
= p− CM(nT ) + ∆Cp
T + Tp
. (20)
With the optimal selection of ∆Cp, the agent is encouraged to adjust its
PM interval as needed for chain coordination.
3.4.2. Cost subsidization under Option 2
Since under Option 2 the agent manages the pool, another mechanism is
needed to cope with its extra acquisition and holding costs. Although similar
to the above mentioned PM bonus, this model is rather based on subsidizing
the spares pooling cost. The scheme creates an incentive for setting the stock
level with the one of the chain, while it keeps the benefits of adjusting the PM
interval. Let ∆cu be the inventory subsidization bonus, the new acquisition
cost is thus
c′u = cu −∆cu. (21)
The expected profit for the client adding the bonus effect is
Πc(nT, S) = rA(nT, S)− p− Cd(S)− ∆Cp
T + Tp
−∆cu
(
S0 +
∑
j
Sj
)
. (22)
The expected profit for the agent adding the bonus effect is
Πa(nT, S) = p− CM(nT )− (Cv(S) + Ch(S)) + ∆Cp
T + Tp
+ ∆cu
(
S0 +
∑
j
Sj
)
.(23)
The cost subsidization models for Option 1 and Option 2 induce the agent
to optimally perform both maintenance and stockholding services. Such pol-
icy ensures maximum supply chain performance.
4. Case study
In the following case study, the critical components of interest are prin-
cipal alternators of a fleet of haul trucks operating in a copper mining com-
pany. This client contracts out the fleet maintenance service to a specialized
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Table 2: Parameters for the joint maintenance-stockholding model.
Parameter Value Unit
Preventive maintenance h0 0.001 (1/Kh)
strategy β 3
Tp 1 (Kh)
Tr .3 (Kh)
Cp 8 (KUS$)
Cr .4 (KUS$)
r 1500 (KUS$)
p 350 (KUS$)
α 0.95
n 5 (overhauls)
Spare components N 20 (trucks)
stockholding zi 1 (alternator/truck)
Tat 933 (h)
cu 80 (KUS$)
cd0 5.3 (KUS$/h/truck)
i 0.1
agent attempting to ensure high equipment performance. The parameters
for the preventive maintenance strategy and spare components stockholding
are shown in Table 2.
Figure 1 shows the system availability resulting of merging both the avail-
ability related to maintenance strategy and the spares stockholding service
level. Higher service level can be provided as the spares stock level S in-
creases, but higher investment is required. Moreover, the optimal PM inter-
val T changes over the associated spares stock range. Under the proposed
framework, the system availability A(nT, S) is clearly the performance indi-
cator of interest and thereby it is used to coordinate the chain profits during
the contract.
Figures 2 and 3 reveal the differences in profits depending on the allo-
cating position of the critical spare components pool. The results of above
mentioned Option 1 and Option 2 are obtained by solving Equations 13
to 17 as follows. When the client manages the pool, the joint values [T, S]
are [18000, 0] for the agent and [11000, 3] for the client. The corresponding
single profits are Πa(nT, S) =US$ 287, 888 and Πc(nT, S) =US$ 935, 142.
Conversely, when the agent manages the pool, the joint values are [18000, 0]
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Figure 1: System availability by integrating T and S.
for the agent and [10000, 10] for the client. The respective single profits
are Πa(nT, S) =US$ 1, 149, 772 and Πc(nT, S) =US$ 287, 888. It is consid-
ered that p is set to fulfill the profit constraint pi. Before subsidization, the
corresponding profits for the supply chain by using optimal parties T ∗ inter-
vals are Π(nT ∗a , S) =US$ 1, 169, 230 and Π(nT
∗
c , S) =US$ 1, 211, 243 for Op-
tion 1, and Π(nT ∗a , S) =US$ 1, 169, 230 and Π(nT
∗
c , S) =US$ 1, 206, 436 for
Option 2. However, the optimal supply chain joint value [T ∗, S∗] is [15000, 3],
which leads to a higher profit Π(nT, S) =US$ 1, 219, 018. Therefore, the op-
timal duration of the contract is n(T ∗ + Tp) = 5(15000 + 1000) = 80000(h)
From the previous results, it is clear that taking into account the entire
supply chain is the best possible scenario. As expected, the joint values
related to the client are closer to the optimal channel profit. The agent
must be motivated to adjust its PM interval and stock as needed for chain
coordination. To achieve this result, the cooperative mechanisms described
in Section 3.4 are used. Under Option 1, the interval of the agent is certainly
higher than desired, thus the client subsidizes the PM cost. In this case,
∆Cp = 2.853 sets the agent PM interval with the one of the chain, namely
from T = 18000 to T = 15000. Under Option 2, it is clear that the agent
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decides to keep the stock level as low as possible since the extra acquisition
and holding costs. Hence, the client decides to subsidize those significant
inventory costs. In this case, ∆cu = 55.030 sets the the stock level with the
one of the chain.
After subsidization, profits for the whole supply chain by using optimal
single intervals align with the maximum value Π(nT, S) =US$ 1, 219, 018.
Nonetheless, as expected, the single profits change across options. For exam-
ple, the client profit decreases from US$935, 142 to US$915, 065 due to to the
subsidization mechanism, and the agent profit increases from US$287, 882 to
US$303, 953. For further details on changes for both subsidization options,
Figures 4 and 5 denote a sensitivity analysis for those optimal joint values
that maximize the profit for the entire channel. As above demonstrated, the
supply chain benefit is higher than those singly obtained by the contracting
parties. Furthermore, the proposed framework motivates both chain parties
to improve their maintenance and supply services continuously.
5. Conclusions
This article has introduced a model for defining the optimal manager
of the pool of components within outsourcing services. A decision-making
framework was defined to integrate preventive maintenance with critical
spares stockholding for contract profitability. This interesting policy has
been evaluated to induce the parties involved to perform maintenance and
supply activities cooperatively, rather than a separated non-optimal way.
This aim is achieved by setting a joint value consisting of preventive mainte-
nance strategy and spare parts stock level that maximizes the total expected
profit for both client and agent.
It has been found the joint values that reach the supply chain coordi-
nation for the two options under study, when the client handles the spare
components and when the pool manager is the agent. However, there are
scenarios where the expected profit is not sufficient to drive changes in the
policy. To provide an incentive to set parties’ joint values with the one of the
supply chain, subsidizing bonuses for additional PM performed and sensitiz-
ing spares acquisition and holding costs are suitable methods. The procedure
to estimate such values has been developed.
Finally, we have demonstrated that the model is capable of coordinately
optimizing business performance for the entire supply chain. Both client
and agent are encouraged to continually improve their maintenance services,
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Figure 2: Study of optimal T and S when the client manages the pool of spare components.
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Figure 3: Study of optimal T and S when the agent manages the pool of spare components.
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Figure 4: Study of optimal T and S when the client subsidizes the PM cost of the agent.
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thus obtaining higher joint benefits compared to those when no coordination
occurs.
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